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ABSTRACT
Program fuzzing—providing randomly constructed inputs to a com-
puter program—has proved to be a powerful way to uncover bugs,
find security vulnerabilities, and generate test inputs that increase
code coverage. In many applications, however, one is interested in
a target-oriented approach—one wants to find an input that causes
the program to reach a specific target point in the program. We
have created TOFU (for Target-Oriented FUzzer) to address the
directed fuzzing problem. TOFU’s search is biased according to a
distance metric that scores each input according to how close the
input’s execution trace gets to the target locations. TOFU is also
input-structure aware (i.e., the search makes use of a specification
of a superset of the program’s allowed inputs).
Our experiments on xmllint show that TOFU is 28% faster than
AFLGo, while reaching 45% more targets. Moreover, both distance-
guided search and exploitation of knowledge of the input structure
contribute significantly to TOFU’s performance.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Fuzz testing is an automated technique for testing a program by
generating random inputs and running the program on those inputs.
It is widely used for identifying bugs and security vulnerabilities,
and for generating test inputs that increase code coverage.
Even when used for identifying bugs and security vulnerabilities,
the focus of standard fuzz testing is on increasing code coverage:
more code covered generally results in more bugs found. However,
in many applications one wants to find an input that causes the
program to reach a specific target point in the program (or set of
target points). For instance, one might be interested in (i) generating
inputs that exercise newly patched code, or (ii) as away to reproduce
a crash, generating inputs that exercise regions of code known to be
likely to cause a crash. In other words, one is interested in a directed
approach, in which the target points are given a higher priority
than other parts of the program. The goal of a target-oriented fuzzer
is to spend the available computational resources on the task of
reaching those specific points in the program.
Given some target locations in the source code, craft a set of
inputs that causes these locations to be reached during execution.
Unfortunately, the techniques used in standard fuzzers offer little
control over which parts of the program are explored. For example,
American Fuzzy Lop (AFL) [38] is a state-of-the-art standard fuzzer.
However, AFL does not make use of any information about the
structure of the program’s inputs, and thus creates many inputs that
are rejected by the program. This approach is less useful for finding
inputs that reach specific locations—particularly if the targets are
deep in the part of the program that constitutes its core computation,
rather than in the program’s input-validation code.
AFLGo [4] is a system that supports target-oriented fuzzing.
However, many of AFLGo’s features are inherited from the Ameri-
can Fuzzy Lop (AFL) [38]; in particular, AFLGo does not use any
information about the structure of the program’s inputs.
Most modern fuzzers share the same structure: a loop involving
mutation, feedback, and evaluation of fitness. AFL is an example: at
each step, the input is mutated; if the mutant causes an execution
run that has a new edge-coverage profile, the mutant is retained as
a seed for further mutation.
Fuzzing works well because small changes in inputs usually
cause a small change in the parts of the program that are exercised.
For target-oriented fuzzing, this “stability heuristic” can be used to
steer the fuzzer toward an input that reaches the desired target: by
focusing on inputs that are closer to the target, the fuzzer might
generate inputs that are even closer. The hope is that this process
will eventually allow the target to be reached.
Unfortunately, random changes to some bits or bytes of the input
can significantly change the program’s execution; for instance, such
a change can turn a valid input into an invalid input (leading to an
execution run that is usually much farther away from the desired
target).
For target-oriented fuzzing, one way to restore the stability
heuristic is by taking advantage of known structure of the pro-
gram’s inputs: the heuristic is now that small structural changes in
inputs usually cause a small change in the parts of the program that
are exercised, and the fuzzer can take advantage of such behavior
to steer itself to an input that reaches the desired target.
TOFU: Target-Oriented FUzzer. In our work, we have created
a new directed fuzzer, called TOFU. The high-level structure of
TOFU is similar to that of AFL; however, there are two important
differences.
(1) TOFU’s goal is to produce inputs that reach a specific set of
targets in the program. TOFU pre-computes the distance between
each pair of basic blocks, and uses these distances, together with
the outcome of executing various inputs, to determine the order
in which inputs are selected for mutation.
(2) TOFU leverages knowledge of the program’s input structure,
which is provided by the TOFU user in the form of a protobuf
specification [12].
We are interested in understanding how much these two aspects
of TOFU contribute to its overall effectiveness, which gives rise to
the following research questions:
Research Question 1: What is the contribution of distance-
guided search to TOFU’s overall effectiveness?
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Research Question 2: What is the contribution of structured
mutation to TOFU’s overall effectiveness?
The existing AFLGo and Hawkeye [6] tools are also target-
oriented fuzzers. Their high-level organization is similar to TOFU’s
in that the source code is first analyzed to generate a static metric,
and then the metric is used to guide the subsequent process of dy-
namic exploration. However, TOFU addresses the following issues
in a different way than existing tools:
(1) The input space for both AFLGo and Hawkeye is a single file or
stdin, as in AFL. However, the input space for many programs
is larger than a single file. For instance, a program may use
command-line flags to indicate option settings. AFL is designed
to maximize coverage, which means that it might need different
flag settings: different flag settings can lead to execution runs
that cover different parts of the program. However, a directed
fuzzer has a different goal, namely, to reach a specific target, or
set of targets, in the program.
To reach specific locations in the program, it may be necessary
to provide specific flags on the command line. TOFU augments
the input space that it explores to include command-line flags,
so that users do not have to select such flags manually. (This
aspect of TOFU’s approach also reduces what the user has to
understand about the program.)
(2) One wishes to generate inputs that reach desired targets as
quickly as possible. AFLGo introduced scheduling via simulated
annealing: i.e., inputs closer to the target get mutated more.
Hawkeye adopted scheduling via simulated annealing and added
prioritization: i.e., inputs closer to the target are mutated first.
The Hawkeye work showed that, without prioritization, an input
that nearly reaches a target might wait for a long time before
getting mutated (cf. Chen et al. [6]).
TOFU only applies prioritization, but uses a different metric
than the ones used in AFLGo and Hawkeye. TOFU’s metric has
an intuitive interpretation as a distance (e.g., the number of
correct branching decisions needed to reach the target), whereas
scheduling in AFLGo (as well as prioritization in Hawkeye) has
a complicated relationship to the history of the annealing that
has taken place, and has no intrinsic meaning as a distance.
(3) Both AFLGo and Hawkeye use the mutators from AFL, which is
general-purpose, but not structure-aware. The mutation opera-
tions can create many invalid inputs. This approach is useful for
triggering buggy behavior somewhere in the program (which is
appropriate for standard fuzzing), but it is hard for a structure-
blind fuzzing tool to find an input that passes the input-validation
tests typically performed by a program, and even harder for it
to find an input that reaches a desired target.
Because TOFU mutates inputs with respect to a specification
of the input language, it has an easier time finding valid inputs,
which (often) allows it to find inputs that reach a target that is
deep in the program.
These differences lead to the following research question:
Research Question 3: How does the performance of TOFU
compare to existing tools?
We found that the time taken by TOFU (pre-fuzzing) to compute
distance information and to insert instrumentation was 1/40 the time
taken by AFLGo. Moreover, the success rate for TOFU, measured by
how many target basic blocks are covered, is 45% higher than that
of AFLGo (Table 3). TOFU is also 28% faster than AFLGo (Figure 5).
Command-line Fuzzing and Staged Fuzzing. In response to the
common practice of using command-line flags to specify options to
a program, TOFU includes command-line arguments in the input
space that it explores. Prior fuzzing tools have not emphasized
exploration of these inputs. Command-line flags are commonly
used by many programs, while most fuzzing tools focus mainly
on one input file used by the program under test (which is often
specified by some file argument on the command line). It is often
necessary to supply the program with specific flags for particular
target basic blocks to be reachable. A user could read the source code
to try to understand what flags must be set; however, the targets
could be any locations in the source code, and the manual approach
could require a big investment of time. To address this issue, TOFU
first performs a search—which is really just a variant of its “core
search” using a distance metric and structured mutation—to find
appropriate flag settings and options to flags that get close to the
target basic blocks. (In fact, in 60% percent of the cases, command-
line fuzzing alone succeeded in reaching one or more of the target
basic blocks.)
Our experiment on libxml2[2] showed the effectiveness of di-
viding the fuzzing process into stages. In particular, fuzzing the flags
and fuzzing the primary input file can be carried out in sequence.
This approach reduces the dimensionality of the input space for
each individual stage of fuzzing, and we found that fuzzing effi-
ciency is improved by doing so. The idea of staged fuzzing also
appeared in Zest [21], in which the fuzzing process is divided into
syntactic-fuzzing and semantic-fuzzing stages. We believe that the
staged-fuzzing idea can be further exploited if the input space can
be divided into more fine-grained stages.
Contributions. Our work makes three main contributions:
(1) We use structured mutation to address the problem of target-
oriented fuzzing.
(2) We expand the idea of staged fuzzing. TOFU augments the search
space for fuzzing to include a program’s command-line flags. To
reduce the dimensionality of the search carried out, command-
line fuzzing is carried out separately, and prior to, the fuzzing of
the program’s primary input file.
To support this task, TOFU provides a generator of structured
mutators for a family of command-line languages typical of those
used by many Linux programs. TOFU—equipped with such a
mutator—could be used as a pre-processing step to select appro-
priate command-line flags, before letting another fuzzing tool
take over to fuzz the program’s primary input file.
(3) The tool chain of TOFU consists of multiple components that can
be reused in other tools. For example, TOFU’s phase of distance
computation takes only about 2 minutes for libxml2, while
AFLGo’s distance computation takes about 80minutes. Moreover,
the distance computation is not a one-time investment—it is
needed for each set of targets.
TOFU also comes with specifications of different languages of
structured inputs, which can be reused for fuzzing multiple appli-
cation programs. For instance, the input language for libxml2
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1 bool is_valid(string input){
2 # validate the input with respect to grammar (1)
3 }
4
5 int num_a(string input){
6 # count how many number of a's in input
7 }
8
9 int main(int argc, char** argv){
10 string input = argv[1];
11 if(!is_valid(input))
12 perror("Invalid input\n");
13
14 ...
15 if(num_a(input) == 10){
16 # target location
17 }
18 }
Figure 1: Example for structured mutator.
is XML; thus, specification that we created for fuzzing libxml2
can be reused for any application that takes an XML file as input.
Organization. The remainder of the paper is organized as fol-
lows: §2 presents two examples to motivate the problem that TOFU
addresses. §3 gives an overview of how instrumentation and execu-
tion is carried out in TOFU. §4 presents the details of the algorithms
used in TOFU. §5 presents experimental results. §6 discusses threats
to the validity of our results. §7 discusses different aspects of TOFU.
§8 discusses related works. §9 concludes.
2 EXAMPLES
Structured Mutator. Consider the program shown in Fig. 1, and
suppose that its input language is described by the grammar
S → aSa | bSb | ϵ (1)
The program first validates the input; then performs other computa-
tions; and finally counts the number of occurrences of the character
a in the input.
This example illustrates why a fuzzer can perform much better
if it mutates the input with respect to the input grammar. For
execution to reach the target location in line 16, the input must be
grammatically correct—i.e., it must be a string in L(S) of grammar
(1)—and contain exactly 10 occurrences of the character “a”. Any
single-character mutation of a grammatically valid input creates
an invalid input that will be rejected by the program in line 12.
Therefore, even if a valid input yields an execution that gets close
to the target location, a single-character mutation will create an
input that is never close to the target location. Moreover, for a
single-character mutation to create an input that reaches the target
location, it must start with an invalid input that would be rejected
by the program (and hence one whose execution is never close to
the target location).
1 static char const shortopts[] =
2 "0123456789abBcC:dD:eEfF:hHi" \
3 "I:lL:nNpPqrsS:tTuU:vwW:x:X:y";
4
5 bool ignore_blank_lines = false;
6
7 int main (int argc, char **argv) {
8 while ((c = getopt_long (argc, argv, shortopts,
longopts, NULL)) != -1) {
9 switch (c) {
10 case 'B':
11 ignore_blank_lines = true;
12 break;
13 ...
14 }
15 exit_status = compare_files (...);
16 }
17 }
18
19 static int compare_files (...) {
20 ...
21 status = diff_2_files (&cmp);
22 ...
23 }
24
25 int diff_2_files (struct comparison *cmp) {
26 ...
27 if (ignore_blank_lines) {
28 if(analyze_hunk(...))
29 #target location
30 else ...
31 }
32 ...
33 }
Figure 2: Example for command-line fuzzing.
Staged Fuzzing. We present a code snippet to illustrate the
staged-fuzzing idea and how our flag fuzzer works. The code snip-
pet in Fig. 2 is a slightly modified version of code found in the
diff program in diffutils[1]. The input for diff consists of
command-line flags with options and two files (or directories, or
stdin). Suppose that the target is in the diff_2_files function,
as shown in the code snippet; to reach the target, it is necessary
that ignore_blank_lines be set to true, which requires diff be
invoked with the flag -B. Consider two executions of diff in which
one contains the flag -B in the input, and the other does not. In the
first case, execution enters the if condition at line 27, while in the
second case, execution does not enter the if condition. Therefore,
the basic-block coverage in the first case is closer to the target loca-
tion than the basic-block coverage in the second case. By measuring
the distance, TOFU can decide that, to reach the target, -B is likely
needed as part of the command line.
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Targets WALi Instrumentation SourceCode
Input Structure Specification
Exit Priority Queue Mutator Instrumented Program InitialInputs
Program Structure
Distance Files
Selected Input Mutated Inputs
Coverage Profiles
Static
Phase
Dynamic
Phase
Figure 3: Workflow of TOFU: Round-cornered nodes indicate inputs for TOFU, where initial inputs are optional. Elliptical
nodes denote elements of TOFU’s static phase. Square nodes with a frame indicate TOFU’s dynamic/fuzzing phase. The square
node without a frame indicates the exit.
3 OVERVIEW OF TOFU
Figure 3 shows TOFU’s overall workflow. TOFU performs a static
phase, during which it (i) instruments the source code, and (ii)
pre-computes distances in a modified interprocedural control-flow
graph, and a dynamic phase during which it mutates inputs and ex-
ecutes the program. As depicted in Figure 3 via the round-cornered
nodes, TOFU takes as inputs the source code, the target lines, and
the input-structure specification. During the static phase (above
the dotted line), TOFU instruments the program so that at runtime,
it can extract the basic-block coverage from each execution run of
the program. In addition, TOFU generates distance files that record
the pairwise distance from each basic block in the instrumented
program to each target basic block. These files are used during the
dynamic phase to guide input selection. Moreover, because fuzzing
during the dynamic phase is structure-aware, TOFU also takes in a
specification of the structure of allowed inputs, and generates the
structured mutator that is used in the dynamic phase.
During the dynamic phase (below the dotted line), the fuzzer exe-
cutes the instrumented program, and assigns scores to the different
inputs based on the executed basic blocks and the distance metric.
All of the inputs generated are stored in a priority queue, where
the priority indicates how close the trace obtained from the input
came to the target set. On each round, the closest input is selected
from the priority queue for mutation; the structured mutator then
generates a user-specifiable number of new mutated inputs.
The dashed frame of the node labeled “Initial Inputs” in Figure 3
indicates that the initial inputs are optional. Because TOFU uses
a structured mutator, it does not have to start with initial inputs;
instead, it can generate them according to the structural specifica-
tion. The fuzzing process performs the loop shown in the “Dynamic
Phase” portion of Figure 3. Fuzzing terminates when each target
basic block is reached by some input, or a timeout threshold is
exceeded.
4 DETAILED DESCRIPTION
4.1 Gray-Box Fuzzing with Prioritization
The fuzzing process is a repeated loop of mutation and execution,
until all target basic blocks are reached or the timeout threshold
is exceeded. During each iteration, TOFU selects a seed input and
generates multiple new mutated inputs based on the selected input.
The number of mutated inputs generated in each mutation round
can be defined by the user. The mutated inputs are similar to the
seed input, and thus the coverage induced by each mutant is likely
to be similar to the coverage induced by the seed input. The hope
is that each time TOFU creates mutants from the input selected
as the seed, the induced coverage for some of the newly mutated
inputs will get closer to the target set. In this way, the program’s
execution traces are likely to get gradually closer to—and eventually
reach—members of the target set.
TOFU uses a priority queue to store candidate inputs, and the
priority is a function of both the static distance files generated in the
static-analysis phase and the coverage induced by each input. At
the beginning of the dynamic phase, TOFU reads the pre-computed
distance files generated during the static phase. A distance fileMt
contains the distances from each basic block b in the program to a
target block t . The distance db,t represents the minimum number
of choices that would have to be made correctly, for an input that
causes execution to reach b, to continue on to t .
When a mutant j is generated from a seed input i , TOFU executes
the instrumented program with j, and the coverage produced by
the program is retrieved by TOFU. The fitness score for a pair
(j, t), where t is some target block, is the minimum of the distances
induced by all of the basic blocks reached during the execution of j .
The interpretation of this score is that it represents the minimum
number of additional choices that a mutation of j would have to
make correctly to reach t . The priority for j is the minimum of j’s
fitness scores across all of the target blocks.
Distance Computation. The goal of the distance computation is
to count how many constraints remain to reach the target location
for each basic block.
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Given the inter-procedural control-flow graph (ICFG) of the
instrumented program, to compute such distances we label the
graph’s edges with lengths—and introduce new edges—as follows:
if an edge has no branches, we give the edge the length 0; otherwise,
we give the edge the length 1. (The edges involving branches are
the control-flow edges that have more than one successor, and
the indirect-call edges that have more than one potential callee.)
Additionally, we also add edges with length 0 from a basic block
to its immediate post-dominators. We then compute the shortest
distance in the modified ICFG between each basic block and each
target basic block. (If block b2 is not reachable from b1, then the
distance from b1 to b2 will be∞.)
An ideal distance computation would be context-sensitive: when
computing the distance from an input i to a target t : only feasible
paths from each basic block in the execution trace of i to t should be
considered. However, this approach would require TOFU to record
the call stack for each element of i’s execution trace. Thus, to reduce
the run-time overhead of instrumentation, only information about
executed basic blocks is reported; in particular, the contents of the
call stack are not reported for each basic block encountered. We
use a heuristic to approximate the context-sensitive metric. The
intuition for the heuristic is that only functions that can reach the
target locations in the call graph are considered in the distance
computation. Basic blocks in functions that cannot reach any target
location via some call chain are considered irrelevant. Therefore, if
there is no call path from main to the target locations via a given
call edge, we give the call edge the length∞ in the modified ICFG.
In TOFU, the distances used for prioritization are computed
by a generalization of Dijkstra’s algorithm [30, §6.5]; it computes
interprocedural (context-sensitive) distances in the modified ICFG.
4.2 Structured Mutation
Mutation-based directed fuzzing relies on the heuristic that al-
though mutating an input generates a similar input, the coverage of
the mutated input can be different from the coverage of the original
input. Thus, selecting those mutants whose coverage is closer to
one of the target blocks is likely to produce an input that is closer
to a desired input (i.e., one that reaches a target block). Iterating
this process may eventually generate a desired input.
A structure-blind mutator treats the input as a stream of bytes,
modifying the bytes little-by-little, but it can also transform a valid
input into a syntactically invalid input. Structured mutation modi-
fies an input with respect to its underlying structure. Structured mu-
tation has recently been used by AFLSmart [25] and Superion [36].
However, the goal of structured mutation in those two tools is to
increase the coverage when using fuzzing to test programs. TOFU
uses structured mutation to support directed fuzzing.
4.2.1 Protobuf-Based StructuredMutation. In TOFU, the structured
mutator is based on the Google libprotobuf-mutator [11]. Proto-
col buffers (“protobufs”) are a “language-neutral, platform-neutral
extensible mechanism for serializing structured data” [12]. Google
also developed libprotobuf-mutator, a tool to randomly mutate
protobufs.
To use libprotobuf-mutator in the context of TOFU, a TOFU
user provides a standard protobuf-specification file that describes the
structure of the inputs to the program. This specification file is then
1 --silent|optional|no option
2 -v|optional|no option
3 --version|optional|no option
4 --help|optional|no option
5 file1|required|directory|PATH_TO_DIRECT
6 file2|required|directory|PATH_TO_DIRECT
Figure 4: Example input specification for the generator of
command-line-language mutators.
compiled into a C++ class C . A program input corresponds to an
object of classC ; the mutator generated via libprotobuf-mutator
operates on such objects: it modifies a given object into a mutant
object.
A user also provides a renderer function that transforms an ob-
ject of class C into an input (in the form of text). This function
renders the mutated object as the corresponding input text, on
which TOFU’s dynamic phase can then execute the instrumented
program.
If a user wishes to start TOFU with some initial inputs, then they
must provide a parser function that transforms initial inputs into
the corresponding object of class C .
To summarize, if the user is familiar with the input language,
it usually takes one or two days to implement the input-language
grammar and the renderer function. In the authors’ experience,
the most difficult part is the parser function. In general, however,
the program under test contains code that parses the input, which
can serve as the starting point for the parser function for TOFU.
If the user decides not to use initial inputs, a parser function is
not required. Once all the components of a structured mutator
have been created, they can be used with all programs that use the
same input language. This re-usability is an added bonus when one
expends the effort to specify a structured mutator for TOFU.
4.2.2 Command-Line-Language Structured Mutator. Command-
line flags are commonly used in many programs. In many AFL
variants, users must specify these flags when fuzzing the program.
Compared to standard fuzzing (i.e., fuzzing intended to increase
coverage), having appropriate flag values is more important in
target-oriented fuzzing because some target blocks can only be
reached when certain flags are given. For efficiency reasons, it is
also desirable to use the minimal number of flags and options, so
that a fuzzer does not explore irrelevant parts of the program and
mutate unnecessary parts of the input.
It is inefficient to use a general-purpose mutator to mutate
command-line input. Fortunately, many command-line languages
are both simple and highly structured, using flag-names with dashes
and taking options listed after the flag. While creating a struc-
tured mutator for a command-line language manually is not overly
difficult, this task can be tedious and error-prone. To make the
task easier, TOFU provides a tool that takes a specification of the
command-line flags and options, and generates a structured mu-
tator for the command-line language. This mutator is used in a
search—controlled in TOFU’s standard way, by the distance metric
and structured mutation—to determine the flag settings and options
that cause execution to get closest to the target basic block.
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Fig. 4 is taken from the experiment with the cmp program from
diffutils. It shows an example of the kind of input specification
that a user provides to create a command-line-language mutator,
using TOFU’s command-line-language mutator generator. In Fig. 4,
- -silent, -v, - -version, and - -help are all optional valid flags
without options for cmd; file1 and file2 are required arguments,
which take values from a directory. The directory contains the files
that cmp compares.
4.3 Refinements of Prioritization
TOFU supports two mechanisms beyond basic prioritization of
inputs via its priority queue.
• To increase the “diversity” of the kinds of inputs considered dur-
ing its search, TOFU incorporates a mechanism for suppressing
some inputs that “look too much like” inputs already considered.
This mechanism uses basic-block coverage as a rough measure of
a program’s execution: inputs with different traces may have the
same basic-block coverage; the measure of similarity between
inputs i and j is based on their executions having identical basic-
block coverage. Thus, in addition to the priority queue, TOFU’s
search uses a dictionary D of (basic-block set, count) pairs to
record how many inputs that cover the same set of basic blocks
have been added to the priority queue. When a new mutated
input i is produced, TOFU obtains its coverage set ci—the set
of basic blocks reached during the execution of the program on
i . By querying D with respect to ci , TOFU obtains the count
n = D(ci ), and inserts i in the priority queue with probability
1/(n + 1). This mechanism decreases the probability that TOFU
repeatedly works with similar inputs.
• When an input i with score si is selected from the priority queue,
i is also inserted back into the priority queue, with a new score
of 1.2 × si . In this way, TOFU is able to mutate input i again in
the future; i has an artificially changed priority, but it would still
be prioritized over an input whose distance from the target set
is 20% greater than that of i .
5 IMPLEMENTATION & EVALUATION
5.1 Implementation
TOFU’s uses the Whole-Program-LLVM (WLLVM) [26] tool to
compile the subject program on which fuzzing is to be applied
to a single LLVM bitcode module for analysis. Several subsidiary
analyses are performed, and an instrumented binary is produced
that, during an execution of the (compiled) subject program on a
particular input, allows determining the set of basic blocks that
were reached during execution.
In addition to instrumentation, the main analyses performed
serve to compute the static pairwise distances from each basic
block in the instrumented program to each target basic block.
• TOFU performs the following simple indirect-call analysis to
identify a set of potential callees at each indirect-call site: the
analysis assumes that the set of functions possibly called at a
given indirect-call site s consist of (i) each function f whose
address has been taken, for which (ii) the type of f exactly
matches the pattern of argument-type(s) and return-type that
occurs at s .
• The distance computation described in §4.1 is performed by (i) ex-
tracting the ICFG from WLLVM; (ii) computing immediate-post-
dominator information for each procedure’s CFG; (iii) modifying
the ICFG as described in §4.1 and labeling its edges with 0 or 1,
as appropriate; (iv) encoding the modified ICFG as a weighted
pushdown system, using the WALi-OpenNWA [35] library (the
encoding is performed via a well-known technique [28, §2.2]); (v)
computing interprocedural (context-sensitive) distances using a
technique described in Schwoon et al. [30, §6.5].
5.2 Evaluation
We aim to answer the research questions posed in §1, specifically:
(1) What is the contribution of distance guidance to TOFU’s overall
effectiveness?
(2) What is the contribution of structured mutation to TOFU’s over-
all effectiveness?
(3) How does the performance of TOFU compare to existing tools?
The goal of directed fuzzing is to cover all the target basic blocks
as quickly as possible. We evaluated different tools by checking
how many target basic blocks were reached within a timeout limit.
For each run of each tool, we also determined how long it took to
reach each of of the reached targets.
The tested subjects are space [33], diffutils [1], and xmllint
from libxml2 [2]. Space is a well-established subject for software-
engineering research, and has been studied in several prior pa-
pers [3, 5]. Diffutils and libxml2 were used in the experiments
reported in the AFLGo paper [4].
To answer research question (1), we created a variant of TOFU,
called UG-TOFU (for “Un-Guided TOFU”), which assigns random
numbers as scores in the priority queue, instead of using a score
based on distance. To answer research question (2), we created an-
other variant of TOFU, called US-TOFU (for “Un-Structured TOFU”),
which uses a “dumbed-down” mutator extracted from AFL,1 in
place of TOFU’s structured mutators (which are described in Sec-
tion 4.2.1). To answer research question (3), we ran TOFU, AFLGo,
and Superion—an existing fuzzer with a structured mutator for
XML files—on libxml2.2
Each experiment had same two-phase structure. In phase 1, we
ran TOFU to obtain a set of command-line flags and flag options. In
phase 2, the command-line information obtained from phase 1 was
used for all of the tools in the experiment; during phase 2, the subject
program was fuzzed by each of the tools—i.e., each tool was applied
to the subject program so that it mutated the program’s primary
input file. space only uses a single file as input. Consequently, the
experiment with space had no phase 1: it consisted only of phase
2, using the different tools.
Prior to phase 1 of each experiment, we used TOFU’s genera-
tor of command-line-language mutators to create an appropriate
command-line-language mutator for the subject program. If there
were options available from the program’s test suite, then we used
those options as part of the specification provided to TOFU’s gener-
ator of command-line-language mutators. Otherwise, we manually
1AFL’s mutator consists of three parts, which perform the following steps: (i) deter-
ministic mutation steps, (ii) repeated steps of havoc/random mutations, and (iii) steps
that splice two random inputs together at some randommidpoint. The “dumbed-down”
mutator uses a single havoc step each time it is invoked.
2 Hawkeye was not available to us due to legal restrictions.
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Table 1: Experimental results for space
Trial
Quantity 1 2 3
Total target basic blocks 119 119 119
Target blocks covered by initial inputs 51 48 50
Uncovered target basic blocks 68 71 69
Commits not totally covered 17 15 16
Basic blocks covered by TOFU 21 65 63
Basic blocks covered by AFLGo 5 6 9
Basic blocks covered by UG-TOFU 2 0 18
Basic blocks covered by US-TOFU 0 0 0
constructed a specification of the subject program’s command-line
language by consulting the program’s documentation. During phase
1 fuzzing, TOFU was started from the empty initial input (no flags
or options). The names of all input files from the subject program’s
test suite are provided to the phase 1 fuzzer as potential elements
of the command line that the fuzzer is searching for.
For phase 2 fuzzing, we ran each tool three times to accommodate
variance in running times. We call each run of all the tools a trial.
For each trial, we randomly selected 10 inputs from the subject
program’s test suite, and used that set as the initial inputs for each
tool for that trial. That is, during a given trial, all tools were started
with the same set of initial inputs, flags, and flag options; for a given
tool, each trial starts with a different selection of initial inputs.
For a given tool and a given trial, if a target basic block t was
reached by the tool at least once, we say that the tool covered t in
that trial; if, for a given commit c , at least one new target block was
covered, we say that the tool covered c in that trial.
5.3 Experimental Setup
We ran the experiments on a workstation with twenty-four Intel®
Xeon® X5675 CPUs running at 3.07GHz and 189GB of memory.
All tools in these experiments are parallelizable, and each was given
full use of all CPU cores while running.
For the experiment with space (phase 2 only), and diffutils
(phases 1 and 2), we limit each phase of each trial to 150 seconds. For
the experiment with xmllint (phases 1 and 2), we set the timeout
limit for each phase of each trial to 300 seconds. To fully use all the
available cores, the number of mutated inputs produced in each
round is set to 120 (which is a multiple of the number of cores).
5.3.1 Space. The space program is from the Software-artifact
Infrastructure Repository [8]. Space consists of 9,564 lines of C
code (6,218 executable). It implements an interpreter for an array-
definition language (ADL). It has a total of 39 versions. One of the
versions is the reference version, and each remaining version con-
tains a single fault. We used each version’s fault location as that
version’s target, and hence this set of examples serves as a proxy
for the task of reproducing a crash. Most of the faults correspond to
less than three target basic blocks. Table 1 summarizes the results.
5.3.2 diffutils. We used the GNU diffutils as the subject pro-
gram. It contains four executables: cmp, diff, diff3, and sdiff,
Table 2: Experimental results for diff
Trial
Quantity 1 2 3
Total target basic blocks 220 220 220
Target blocks covered by initial inputs 71 71 71
Uncovered target basic blocks 149 149 149
Commits not totally covered 14 14 14
Basic blocks covered by TOFU 57 66 59
Basic blocks covered by AFLGo 24 24 24
Basic blocks covered by UG-TOFU 40 40 38
Basic blocks covered by US-TOFU 24 24 24
which are all related to finding differences between files. We choose
all the commits from November 2009 to May 2012, and for the n+1st
commit, the target blocks were all new code introduced subsequent
to the nth commit. The total number of target basic blocks is 333.
They are in the files util.c, diff.c, io.c, diff3.c, cmp.c, dir.c, context.c,
and analyze.c. For the targets in diff.c, diff3.c, and cmp.c, most are
reachable by phase 1 fuzzing alone (i.e., by an appropriate choice
of flags and options). The files with the most target basic blocks
are diff.c, io.c and dir.c, each of which has more than 40 target
basic blocks. For each code patch, the target basic blocks are in
general close to each other—i.e., the distances between them are
small according to the metric used by TOFU.
The diffutils executables that we tested were cmp, diff,
diff3.3 There are a total of 8 commits for diff3, 5 commits for
cmp, and 28 commits for diff. During phase 1 fuzzing, all targets
for diff3 were reached; all targets but one for cmp were reached;
and all targets from 14 of the 28 commits for diff were reached.
There are 14 commits for diff in which not all target basic blocks
were completely reached during phase 1 fuzzing.4 We ran TOFU,
AFLGo, UG-TOFU and US-TOFU over the remaining 14 commits,
and the result is summarized inTable 2.
5.3.3 xmllint. Libxml2 is a project and library for working with
XML, and xmllint is a program from libxml2 that can be used
to parse and validate XML files. We chose all commits from May
2012 to October 2014, and for the n + 1st commit, the target blocks
were all new code introduced subsequent to the nth commit. There
are a total of 382 commits, of which 186 are xmllint code changes;
TOFU’s distance computation indicated that the new code intro-
duced in 180 of the commits are apparently reachable. The target
basic blocks are in 38 files. The files with themost target basic blocks
are parser.c, xpath.c, uri.c, encoding.c, tree.c, xmlschemastypes.c,
and buf.c, each of which has more than 200 target basic blocks. Sim-
ilar to diffutils, basic blocks in the same code patch are generally
close to each other.
3 We excluded sdiff for technical reasons. sdiff is really just a launcher for diff.
Rather than exiting normally or crashing, sdiff “terminates” by calling execvp to
replace itself with diff. Our coverage-recording instrumentation does not trigger
when a process self-replaces in this manner.
4 The one remaining target of cmp can only be reached when the command-line input
contains an error, which lies outside the capabilities of TOFU’s command-line fuzzer.
Thus, we excluded this example from this experiment.
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Table 3: Experimental results for xmllint
Trial
Quantity 1 2 3
1. Total target basic blocks 3,064 3,064 3,064
2. Target blocks covered by initial inputs 720 739 772
3. Uncovered target basic blocks 2,344 2,325 2,292
4. Commits not totally covered 127 127 127
5. Basic blocks covered by TOFU 261 270 198
6. Extra commits covered by TOFU 49 50 42
7. Basic blocks covered by AFLGo 160 189 153
8. Extra commits covered by AFLGo 36 37 36
9. Basic blocks covered by Superion 161 140 98
10. Extra commits covered by Superion 32 29 24
11. Basic blocks covered by UG-TOFU 202 214 178
12. Extra commits covered by UG-TOFU 43 44 39
13. Basic blocks covered by US-TOFU 159 143 114
14. Extra commits covered by US-TOFU 33 32 25
During phase 1 fuzzing, all target blocks from 53 commits were
completely reached, leaving 127 commits containing targets for
phase 2. We ran TOFU, AFLGo, Superion, UG-TOFU, and US-TOFU
on these commits; the results are summarized in Table 3.5
We also carried out a more detailed analysis of the data, with the
goal of evaluating TOFU’s performance against each of the other
tools, all as phase-2 fuzzers. The results are shown in Fig. 5. For
most commits, it is difficult for any tool to reach all target basic
blocks, so we needed a way to understand performance when not all
targets are reached. Moreover, we wanted to compare performance
on commits that represented a fuzzing challenge of “appropriate
difficulty.” We define “appropriate difficulty” in terms of a coverage
threshold: for each tool and each commit c , we gathered fine-grained
information about how many of the set Tc of target basic blocks of
c that were not covered (by TOFU) during phase 1 were covered by
the tool during phase 2. Figure 5 shows tool-against-tool plots for
the times to reach ≥ 21% of the targets in Tc .
We could have used a coverage threshold different from 21%;
however, if the threshold is too high, then the study would just show
that each tool rarely reaches the threshold within the timeout limit.
If the threshold is too low, we only get information about the time
needed to reach a single target, which only provides information
about well the tools perform on “low-hanging fruit.”
We picked 21% by reasoning as follows: as shown in lines 6, 8, 10,
12, and 14 of Table 3, the tools covered different sets of commits that
had not already been completely covered during phase 1; in trial
1, the five tools covered 53 extra commits in total, covering 359 of
the 1, 689 targets in those commits; in trial 2, they covered 54 extra
commits, covering 360 of the 1, 677 targets; in trial 3, they covered
49 extra commits, covering 282 of the 1, 491 targets. Thus, we set
the coverage threshold to (359 + 360 + 282)/(1689 + 1677 + 1491) ≈
21% This methodology—where the threshold was chosen based on
5 Superion only accepts initial inputs of size less than 10KB. Therefore, when running
Superion, we discarded any randomly selected initial inputs that exceeded 10KB.
“performance of the group in aggregate”—ensured that the coverage
threshold is challenging for each of the tools.
The results of the study are shown in Fig. 5. Each “×” in a compar-
ison plot in Fig. 5 shows information about the times used by two
tools, A and B, to reach 21% of the targets for some commit. There
are a few additional subtleties in the way this data was gathered.
Granularity: Commits vary in their number of targets. For in-
stance, if some commit has eight targets, we plot the time required
for tool A to reach any two targets against the time required for
tool B to reach any two (which are not necessarily the same two).
Ordering: As mentioned earlier, we ran each tool three times on
each commit, using three different sets of initial inputs. For a given
commit, each tool was provided with the same three input sets.
However, because the coverage threshold was set at a non-trivial
percentage, many runs of the different tools lead to timeouts. When
one tool’s time is below the timeout threshold, and the other tool
times out, a natural choice would be to plot the pair on the north
or east edge of the comparison plot, as appropriate.
We chose a somewhat different strategy, based on the observation
that because each of the tools implements a different search strategy
for mutating inputs (including TOFU, UG-TOFU, and US-TOFU),
their searches diverge due to the different strategies, and so there
is relatively little importance to requiring that the tools’ runs be
matched by their input set. For this reason, we compare two tools’
behaviors with respect to achieving the coverage threshold for a
commit based on their ordered times. That is, when comparing tool
Awith tool B, we create one “×” forA’s fastest trial versus B’s fastest
trial, one “×” for A’s median-speed trial versus B’s median-speed
trial, and one “×” for A’s slowest trial versus B’s slowest trial.
Targets not reached: We also investigated why the targets of
some commits were not reached. A large portion of them are not
reached because they are not related to the primary input file. For
example, patched code from xmlschemas.c needs specific XML
schema files for the targets to be reachable. Some of the code patches
are identified by the distance computation as being reachable from
the entry of xmllint, but the conditions for reaching them are
never satisfied. For example, some patched code is in a procedure
that has a formal parameter whose value must be non-NULL for the
code to be reachable. However, as called from xmllint, the actual
parameter is always NULL. This situation arises because the patched
code resides in a general-purpose library, but xmllint does not
exercise that library in its full generality.
5.4 Findings
For Research Question 1, the experiments show that distance
guidance can improve TOFU’s ability to reach more targets. The
comparison between TOFU and UG-TOFU in Fig. 5 shows that even
without distance guidance, UG-TOFU is able to generate inputs
to reach the coverage threshold in many commits; however, the
performance of UG-TOFU is worse than that of TOFU.
As noted earlier, the locations of code changes in a commit are
generally close to each other; thus, an input that reaches one target
is likely to be similar to an input that reaches others, so mutations of
a successful input may allow a fuzzer to reach other targets. TOFU
prioritizes inputs according to the number of correct branch choices
needed to reach some remaining target; in contrast, UG-TOFU does
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Figure 5: Time comparisons (in seconds), for each tool when ≥ 21% of the uncovered targets for each xmllint commit are
reached. Each blue “×” represents one pair of times. The diagonal red “y = x” line shows where equal execution times would
appear. Thus, each × above the red line is a faster result for TOFU; each × below the red line is a faster result for that plot’s
other tool.
use such distance information, and thus may not explore these
“close-to-successful” inputs immediately.
For Research Question 2, the experiments reveal that the
structured-mutator component is extremely important to TOFU’s
performance. In all experiments, TOFU reaches more targets than
US-TOFU, especially for space, where US-TOFU did not reach a
new target basic block in any of the three trials. It is also notewor-
thy that in experiments from both space and xmllint, AFLGo’s
performance is better than US-TOFU’s. One possible reason is that
US-TOFU’s mutator does not implement all of AFL’s mutator: US-
TOFU’s mutator only performs AFL’s random-mutation step. These
results indicate that if the user does not want to go to the trouble
of providing a specification of valid inputs, then it is likely to be
better to use AFLGo instead of US-TOFU. (Conversely, it would be
interesting to see whether AFLGo would achieve any performance
gain if it adopted or incorporated TOFU’s distance guidance.)
For Research Question 3, our experiments show that TOFU
outperforms existing tools. For the xmllint coverage threshold
experiment, TOFU is 28% faster than AFLGo, and 60% percent
faster than Superion, computed as the geometric mean of the ratio
of each pair. (All timeouts were counted as 300 seconds.) AFLGo
does not use prioritization or a structured mutator. Superion is a
general-purpose fuzzing tool, aiming to improve coverage, rather
than reaching specific locations in the program. For diff, TOFU’s
mutator includes a filesystem language, allowing TOFU to create
new directories and files, which is beyond the capabilities of AFLGo.
On space, TOFU performs much better than AFLGo, while on
xmllint, TOFU’s advantage is not as dramatic. To understand this
difference, we examined xmllint’s source code, and looked for
differences between the targets covered by TOFU vs. AFLGo. Many
of the targets are parsing-related: parser.c has the most target basic
blocks among all source files. AFLGo is good at reaching those
targets. In contrast, for targets that are not in the parsing stage—
for example, targets in xinclude.c—if the initial inputs do not
contain features relevant for reaching the targets, then AFLGo
cannot reach them, whereas TOFU is able to construct inputs that
allow the targets to be reached. Thus, whether TOFU is a better
choice over AFLGo depends on the target: if the target is shallow,
and wild or erroneous input is required to reach the target, then
AFLGo is better; if the target is deep in the program, and requires
features that are not represented in the initial inputs, TOFU is a
better choice. In fact, the degree to which the data is scattered
in the plot of TOFU vs. AFLGo in Fig. 5 suggests that TOFU and
AFLGo have different strengths when it comes reaching different
kinds of targets. As suggested in the Superion paper [36], another
reason may be that XML is weakly-structured, whereas the input to
space is highly structured. As a point of comparison, our protobuf
specification for XML has 142 lines, while our protobuf specification
for the input language of space has 300 lines. Thus, it may be that
TOFU performs better on space than on xmllint (relative to the
performance of AFLGo) because it is more difficult for AFLGo to
create the more structured inputs needed to fuzz space (cf. the first
example in Section 2).
6 THREATS TO VALIDITY
Our empirical evaluation tries to adhere to practices recommended
by Klees et al. [16]. For example, we evaluated each tool multiple
times with randomly selected seed inputs to reduce bias due to any
particular selection of inputs. Klees et al. [16] recommend running
AFL-like fuzzers for at least 24 hours per trial, but that would take
half a year for the 180 xmllint commits we used. However, we
are not trying to maximize coverage as in general fuzzing. TOFU
may be useful for users with limited time, e.g., who want to create
coverage tests for code changes.
To compare the performance of TOFU and AFLGo with a longer
search time, we selected the ten versions from space with the most
uncovered targets. Instead of running for just 150 seconds, we ran
the tools for 1500 seconds. The result is that TOFU still reaches 80%
more targets than AFLGo (compared with 4x–6x more targets for
the 150-second limit—see Table 1).
TOFU only selects targets that its distance computation indicates
are reachable. Our reachability analysis makes a few assumptions
that may not hold for all C programs. For instance, TOFU uses
function type-signatures to approximate the callable set at each
indirect-call site. TOFU does not consider casts, which could allow
a differently typed function to be called. However, the effect of this
imprecision is small. For example, there were only 6 of 186 xmllint
code-change commits for which TOFU considered all targets to be
unreachable. TOFU’s indirect-call analysis is still an advance over
AFLGo, which performs no indirect-call analysis at all.
7 DISCUSSION
Structured Fuzzing: Our structured mutator is based on protobuf
specifications, which cannot capture all constraints on valid inputs.
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We therefore augmented these rough specifications with additional
semantic information. For example, for space inputs, one data field
contains a number k followed by exactly k PORT definitions. Our
protobuf approximation of this format does not have a separate
integer data field corresponding to k . Instead, we count PORT defi-
nitions and reconstruct k accordingly when rendering a protobuf
instance as a program input. Furthermore, we do not have a full
specified set of features for every aspect of the input. For example,
for xmllint inputs, we do not have a full XML Pointer (XPointer)
Language. Instead, we manually construct some XPointers and map
each XPointer into an integer option for the XPointer sub-language.
One advantage of this approach is that the user might have prior
knowledge on what parts in the input are essential to reach certain
targets. A restricted implementation can make the fuzzer reach the
targets faster. Furthermore, protobufs allow inheritance, so the user
can specify different parts of the input separately, then either reuse
or extend specification fragments as needed.
Fuzzing as a Proxy for Symbolic Execution: In theory, symbolic
execution and constraint solving could derive an input to reach a
program location. However, it is always difficult for this approach
to scale well. TOFU offers fuzzing as a proxy for symbolic execution.
TOFU’s distance metric effectively counts how many constraints
must be solved to reach some target. But instead of solving those
constraints, TOFU uses structured mutation to generate input vari-
ants that may have fewer constraints to solve.
Choice of Distance Metric: The distance metric we used counts
how many branches remain to reach the target location. We also
ran our experiments using an alternative metric in which distance
is the shortest distance in the ICFG from a given basic block to
the target basic block. The results were that for most targets, the
performance was nearly the same, and the differences observed did
not reveal that one metric is preferred over the other.
Reproducibility: All randomization in TOFU is governed by a
random-number seed, optionally under user control for repro-
ducibility. However, when running a subject program, TOFU im-
poses a wall-clock time limit. Stopping the execution early can lead
to different basic-block coverage, thereby changing distance mea-
surements, ultimately changing the results of fuzzing. We found
that multiple TOFU trials with a given random seed yielded similar
results. However, AFLGo and US-TOFU (which uses AFL’s random
mutator) form random seeds using system-level entropy sources,
so AFLGo and US-TOFU results can vary more across trials.
8 RELATEDWORK
A common criticism of AFL is that it is inefficient at finding bugs
deep in a program [7, 23, 27, 31]. Driller [31] uses concolic execu-
tion to find deep bugs. VUZZER [27] uses both control-flow and
data-flow analysis to decide where and how to mutate inputs. T-
FUZZ [23] removes sanity checks in the source code and then uses
symbolic execution to select valid inputs. Fairfuzz [17] biases its
search in favor of inputs that execute rarely-executed branches, as
those branches are often hard to cover. Angora [7] uses taint analy-
sis and gradient descent to solve the path constraints. Godefroid
et al. [10] use grammar-based specifications to generate inputs that
reach deeper program paths. TOFU’s structured mutator also uses
grammars, but differently. Instead of generating inputs from scratch,
TOFU mutates existing inputs with respect to a structure specifica-
tion. In this way, TOFU can still utilize feedback from execution on
test inputs, as do many AFL-like fuzzers.
As pointed out in [39], the command-line arguments and options
of a program have an important influence on a program’s behavior.
[39] provides a tool to test command-line arguments and options.
However, it applies only to Python programs, and is a standard
fuzzer (i.e., not target-oriented). It will not provide the appropriate
combination of arguments and options to reach a particular target
location in the program. In contrast, the generator for command-
line languages that TOFU provides is general-purpose, and can
support most command-line languages of Unix utilities. A generated
command-line fuzzer is also set up to perform directed fuzzing, and
thus can generate an appropriate combination of arguments and
options to reach—or get close to—a desired target (or set of targets).
Most fuzzers try to maximize program coverage, but a few
have been driven by other goals. TIFF [14] specifically focuses
on memory-corruption bugs and adds type inference to the input
so that the mutation to certain bytes is driven by specific type
information. Singularity [37] uses fuzzing to solve the worst-case-
complexity problem by transforming the complexity-testing prob-
lem to an optimal program-synthesis problems and then performing
feedback-guided optimization. SLOWFUZZ [24] applies evolution-
ary guidance to generate inputs that trigger worst-case perfor-
mance. RAZZER [15] aims to find race-condition bugs in the kernel
by identifying an over-approximation of points at which data races
potentially occur, and guides fuzzing by using a pre-defined system-
call grammar and thread-interleaving tools to trigger data races.
MoonShine [22] works on optimizing the state-of-the-art kernel
fuzzer, syzkaller [34]. TOFU also uses fuzzing as a technique to
address a non-coverage-maximization problem. TOFU seeks inputs
that reach specific targets in the program, which might also be
tackled using symbolic execution and constraint solving. TOFU’s
approach to reach certain targets in a program could make other
tools more efficient. For example, TOFU could guide RAZZER’s
subroutine to reach the locations of potential data races. Addition-
ally, inputs for triggering worst-case-performance are in general
beyond the parsing stage, so a structured mutator could improve
fuzzers’ efficiency as well.
The idea of guided execution is also found in model checking and
symbolic execution [9, 18–20, 32]. Groce and Visser [13] describe
different heuristics for model checking to deal with state-space
explosion, including various search and structural heuristics, which
are used to decide what to explore next. This work is useful for us
because we can likewise apply different heuristics when we gen-
erate the input. However, instead of model checking, which scales
poorly with program size, we use guided fuzzing, which may be
better suited to handle larger programs. Saxena et al. [29] devised
a novel extension of symbolic execution to analyze input that in-
fluences loop executions. Their work addresses the flag and option
generation problem. In our work, instead of symbolic execution,
we used structured mutation and distance guidance, and do not
rely on constraint solvers, which can have scalability problems.
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9 CONCLUSION
TOFU shows that both structured mutation and distance-based
guidance are beneficial for generating inputs for reaching specific
locations in the program, especially for those deep in the program.
Moreover, TOFU’s guidance metric has an intuitive interpretation
as a distance, so users can understand each input’s “closeness” to
the target. Our experiments also revealed that “shallow” targets,
such as ones in input-parsing code, also commonly appeared dur-
ing the software-development process. Therefore, whether a user
chooses either TOFU or AFLGo depends what kind of target they
need to reach. An AFLGo user could still benefit from TOFU by
using TOFU’s phase 1 fuzzing to select flags and options. AFLGo
might also benefit from adopting TOFU’s distance metric (and im-
plementation of the distance computation).
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